Threats to Society

Threats to Society

How secushare is not a breeding ground for extremism

Users of secushare are socially connected to each other. This has the side effect that extremists of any kind cannot openly advertize their interests as they would get socially isolated by their ethically disagreeing social neighborhood.

We see it everyday in our Tor-based chatroom. People asking to trade guns or rape videos. They can get away with it because Tor gives them non-social anonymity while allowing them to communicate. In secushare they would have real friendships and a reputation to lose.

Only social groups that already found each other in non-social anonymous platforms would be able to migrate to secushare as a group. Contrary to most existing "darknet" platforms secushare would not foster the creation of new such aggregations.

How we can deal with lawful interception

Let's be realistic. Real world governance will not appreciate platforms that produce 100% privacy if individuals that are real threats to society cannot be put under supervision.

Targeted surveillance is in line with the principles of democracy. Democracy needs that bulk surveillance is technically impossible and no authority is given the power to collect knowledge on society in bulk as that has always been a slippery slope into totalitarian regimes, but if surveillance is guaranteed to only be applicable to a limited subset of people, then that can be helpful or even necessary to enable a civil democratic society.

secushare is intended to protect from bulk surveillance, at least on the technological layers it operates on. Its threat model however does not impede targeted surveillance of dangerous individuals, either by using social means of infiltration of dangerous groups or by using technical means of subversion of hardware of individuals.

There may also be the possibility of defining network protocols that implement lawful requirements that a device implementing secushare would comply to, like a message from police, cryptographically signed by a judge, instructing a smartphone to enter surveillance mode for a month. Maybe there is even a way to extend GNUnet's network size estimation algorithm to find out how high the percentage of surveillance is - refusing to enable targeted surveillance if the number of targets exceeds reasonable limits. A secushare device could thus itself try to ensure the constitutionality of a police request before allowing lawful interception to take place.

This all depends on devices being sufficiently unlikely to be tampered with, since it wouldn't be useful if a criminal has a smartphone that informs them that they are under investigation. But that is a complex topic and beyond the scope of this project's website. Also such a scenario probably needs to be accompanied by suitable legislation, which is something we can discuss within the domain as it wouldn't be limited to just secushare.

See also…